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V I 
POINT I 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS BY DOPL 
A. Lack of Factual Foundation Makes Various Statements 
and Arguments by DOPL Irrelevant 
DOPL correctly states that Hodsen is not licensed as a dietician in the State 
of Utah.1 However, this statement is legally irrelevant because certification (rather 
than licensure) of dieticians in Utah is only necessary for those who use the initials 
"CD." or "D." In both the original and present DOPL proceedings, there is no 
evidence that Hodsen has ever used the initials "CD." or "D."; hence, the question 
of certification under the Dietician Certification Act is not relevant.2 
DOPL correctly states that Judge Eves previously found that the exchange 
of information between Hodsen and Anderson constituted "diagnosis".3 The UMPA 
prohibition applicable at this time to Hodsen and Anderson only prohibits 
"diagnosis"; DOPL did not place in the stipulated facts presented to Judge 
Shumate, nor raise in the arguments before Judge Shumate, that the prohibited 
conduct of Hodsen was more than "diagnosis". Nonetheless, DOPL's present legal 
argument claims that Hodsen's conduct "included the actual diagnosis of and 
1
 DOPL Brief at 5. 
2
 See U.C.A. § 58-49-1 et. seq. 
3
 U.C.A § 58-67-102(4)(d). 
1 
prescription of treatment for specific human ailments and medical considerations 
for monetary consideration."4 DOPL's later citation of legal precedent that 
addresses prohibitions on medical "treatment" or "procedure" is a continuation of 
DOPL's erroneous reliance on the existence of facts or prohibitions beyond the 
limited aspect of "diagnosis" relying on truthful and non-misleading information.5 
Furthermore, no factual stipulations or findings have been made as to 
monetary consideration involved in the "diagnosis" that occurs when Hodsen uses 
truthful and non-misleading information provided by Anderson when he gives 
truthful and non-misleading advice to Anderson. Even if Hodsen's compensation 
were assumed to be based on the sale to Anderson of the recommended herb or 
other product of nature, it was specifically stipulated that Anderson (or any other 
customer) need not purchase any of the product from Hodsen.6 




 See U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d). Furthermore, the statutory exemption for those 
involved in the "sale of vitamins, health foods, dietary supplements, herbs or other products 
of nature, the sale of which is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law" is only 
limited by those who "diagnose" a condition; to "treat, correct, or prescribe" or "advise" 
(deleted from the definition of the practice of medicine in 1996) is exempted from licensure. 
6
 See Agreed Statement of Undisputed Facts H 23; Record at 283. 
2 
B. Ignoring Factual Stipulations Regarding Hodsen and Anderson 
Does Not Change Their Legal Relevance 
The material facts of this case were established by stipulation and affidavit 
of Anderson in the district court below . DOPL "objects to Hodsen's statement of 
facts because it mixes stipulated facts with argument."7 This statement does not 
justify ignoring facts that show varied conditions that may be constitutionally 
significant in protecting the constitutional rights of Hodsen and Anderson. 
For example, as it relates to Hodsen, DOPL has failed to (1) acknowledge 
that the information provided to Hodsen can be "a written diagnosis by a licensed 
health care provider indicating . . .a certain health condition," (2) that Hodsen 
identifies what he "believes the nutritional needs of the person most likely are, and 
determines what uncontrolled and lawful herbal or other products of nature would 
likely contribute to satisfying those needs," and (3) that Hodsen may or may not 
disclose the rationale for the advice that he gives to the recipient of his advice.8 
As it relates to Anderson, DOPL has failed to acknowledge that (1) 
Anderson's health condition had not responded to conventional medical treatment, 
(2) Anderson consulted with Hodsen when DOPL had determined he was exempt 
from licensure, (3) her condition has become manageable and her quality of life has 
7
 DOPL Brief at 5 n. 1. 
8
 R. at 282-283; Hodsen and Anderson's Opening Brief at 10-11. 
3 
vastly improved, (4) Anderson is and has been under the care of a licensed 
physician and acupuncturist, (5) Anderson desires the advice or information from 
Hodsen to formulate her religious beliefs regarding the use of wholesome herbs 
and other products of nature "with prudence and thanksgiving"9 and receive both 
physical and spiritual blessings by her exercise of this belief, and (6) her inability to 
receive the information essential to her formulation of belief and exercise has 
damaged her physically, spiritually, and diminished her quality of life.10 
These factual omissions are legally significant in both state and federal 
constitutional analysis addressing the validity of DOPL's need to protect the "public 
health" as applied to Hodsen and Anderson, the significance of the 1996 deletion 
of the word "advise" from the definition of "practice of medicine," and the nature of 
the religious belief that Anderson desires to form and exercise. 
C. Any "Legal Argument" in the Statement of Facts of Hodsen 
Can Be Clarified on Reply as "Fact" or "Law" 
Hodsen and Anderson included in their Statement of Facts an explanation 
of how their exchange of truthful and non-misleading information was prohibited 
under the definitions of "diagnose" and the "practice of medicine."11 Hodsen and 
9
 Doctrine and Covenants 89:11. 
10
 See references to the Record in Hodsen and Anderson's Opening Brief at 8, 11 -14. 
11
 See Opening Brief of Hodsen and Anderson at 8-12. 
4 
Anderson believed such an explanation was a necessary inference of the stipulated 
facts, e.g. to show why after 1996 their previously lawful conduct now exposed them 
to criminal and civil prosecution. To the degree that this explanation was not 
properly stated as facts, Hodsen and Anderson request that this portion of the 
disputed "facts" be recognized as an legal explanation of how the exchange of 
truthful and non-misleading information by Hodsen and Anderson in this case 
violates the statutory provisions prohibiting a person to "diagnose" when marketing 
lawful herbs and other products of nature, and incorporate the same in this brief. 
POINT II 
AS APPLIED TO HODSEN AND ANDERSON, UMPA IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY 
COMPELLING INTERESTS AND IS OVERBROAD 
In determining whether the State may act to override an individual's freedom 
to reject government's paternalistic protection, a balancing of the necessity of the 
State's interest for the public good must be weighed against the importance of the 
individual's rights as recognized in express constitutional texts. Generic exercise 
of governmental power is restricted when it infringes upon or impedes the individual 
exercise of inherent and inalienable, or fundamental rights. 
5 
A. As Applied, UMPA is Not Justified By 
a "Compelling" Governmental Interest 
Hodsen and Anderson do not dispute that Utah Supreme Court opinions 
have assumed that the State of Utah has a basic interest in generally regulating the 
practice of medicine for the benefit of the public. Both parties have quoted 
language from Utah Supreme Court cases recognizing that interest. However, 
notwithstanding DOPL's characterization in their brief of this interest as being 
"compelling," there is no Utah appellate court precedent that specifically identifies 
this interest as being on par with those that have been labeled as being classified 
as being "compelling." 
"A compelling state interest is a 'paramount' interest, one of 'the highest 
order.'"12 Various opinions of the Utah Supreme Court have identified situations 
when the State of Utah has compelling interests. Some compelling interests focus 
on ensuring certain rights of citizens are protected. For example, because of the 
rights protected by Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution, "[t]he State has a 
compelling interest in insuring that all parties are able to resolve legal disputes 
before a neutral tribunal. . .keeping the courts open."13 Others are based on the 
exercise of governmental power specifically referred to in the constitutional text. 
12
 Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1250 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted.) 
13
 id. at 1250-1251. 
6 
For example, it is not surprising that the power to tax has been recognized as being 
a "compelling interest."14 Finally, there has been judicial recognition of situations 
when the Legislature has identified certain interests as being "compelling."15 
However, unlike these identified interests, the regulatory practice of medicine has 
not been specifically recognized by Utah appellate courts as being "compelling," or 
a state interest identified as such by either a specific constitutional provision 
mandating the same or specific determinations by the Legislature that an interest 
reflected in laws of general application (without exceptions) was a "compelling" 
governmental interest. 
B. As Applied to Hodsen and Anderson, UMPA Is Overbroad 
The statutory authority DOPL is relying on to regulate the truthful and non-
misleading conduct of Hodsen and Anderson is overbroad. 
Statutory overbreadth. . .is a substantive due process question which 
addresses the issue of whether 'the statute in question is so broad that 
it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit 
constitutionally protected activity as well.'16 
14
 Marbov v. Utah State Tax Commission, 904 P.2d 662, 669 (Utah 1995). 
15
 J.M., N.P., and R.S. v. State of Utah, 940 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah App. 1997) citing 
U.C.A. § 78-30-4.12(2)(a) ("The state has a compelling interest in providing a stable and 
permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner".) 
16
 Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1268 
(Utah 1997) (citations omitted.) 
7 
In time of conflict, "[t]he less a right is protected the lower the threshold for state 
regulation, while the more the right deserves protection, the more compelling the 
state's interest must be to merit interference."17 Hodsen and Anderson have relied 
on specific provisions of the Utah or United States Constitutions that protect private 
or religious speech, commercial speech, or part of Anderson's formulation of 
religious belief, free exercise of religious practice, and exercise of personal, 
physical autonomy.18 When the right asserted is expressly protected by the text of 
the Utah Constitution, "the more compelling the state's interest must be to merit 
interference." A general reliance on a need to protect public health is insufficient 
to constitute a "compelling interest" of significant enough magnitude to prevent two 
competent adults from formulating religious belief and practice through the truthful 
and non-misleading private or commercial speech regarding herbs and other 
products of nature that are lawfully sold in the marketplace. 
17
 Elks Lodge #719 and # 2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control. 905 
P.2d 1189, 1195 (Utah 1995), cert, denied 517 U.S. 1221, 116S.Ct. 1850, 134L.Ed.2d 
950(1996). 
18
 Anderson's position on appeal to a right of personal autonomy and bodily integrity has 




LEGAL PRECEDENT CITED BY DOPL DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE 
PROHIBITING OF EXCHANGE OF TRUTHFUL INFORMATION 
DOPL has claimed that Hodsen and Anderson have failed to properly 
distinguish between state and federal constitutional claims.19 DOPL has also 
discussed a 1985 concurring opinion by Justice Byron White of the United States 
Supreme Court20 (which is not relevant to its other cited state or federal opinions) 
to suggest a form of analysis that should be followed in this case. Both positions 
are erroneous. 
A. Hodsen and Anderson Have Properly Presented Different Analysis of 
Protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions 
Hodsen and Anderson have properly sought protection of their inherent and 
inalienable rights of religion and speech under the Utah Constitution. Relevant, self-
executing provisions of the Utah Constitution have been applied after determining 
whether or not there is informative history provided by Utah's Constitutional 
Convention, the text's plain language, comparable texts available from sister 
jurisdictions, and the relevant constitutional texts as a whole. The express State 
constitutional provisions relied upon are not found in the United States 
19
 DOPL Brief at 12-13. 
20
 Lowe v. Securities Exchange Commission, 472 U.S. 181,211, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 2573, 
86 L.Ed.2d 130 (1985) (White, J., concurring in result). 
9 
Constitution.21 Seeking protection from state constitution provisions before turning 
to federal protections allows for greater protection of inherent and inalienable rights 
that have deep meaning in Utah's unique heritage and reaffirms important concepts 
of comity and federalism. 
Federal analysis of religious rights, regulation of private and public or 
commercial speech, (a distinction not addressed in the text of the Utah Constitution 
or Utah case law), suggests a different form of analysis than that suggested by 
present interpretation of the Utah Constitution. Achieving a similar result — allowing 
truthful and non-misleading expression — can be achieved by both even though the 
form and nature of analysis could well be different. 
B. The Precedent Relied Upon By DOPL to Justify UMPA Is 
Not Relevant to the Facts of this Case 
DOPL has asserted that a 1985 concurring opinion by Justice Byron White 
and other state and federal decisions are instructive of the analysis that should be 
applied in this case. This claim is erroneous as a matter of law and fact. 
There are at least four reasons why this court should not follow the 
suggestion by DOPL that the application of the UMPA to Hodsen and Anderson is 
See Opening Brief of Hodsen and Anderson at 19-21 (religious freedoms). 
10 
justified by dicta in Justice Byron White's 1985 concurring opinion which explored 
possible constitutional constraints associated with regulating the speech by one 
who had previously engaged in illegal conduct regarding security laws. First, the 
opinion is not binding on this court or any federal court.22 Second, Hoffman II was 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court after the 1985 concurring opinion and made 
no reference to it or engaged in any of the analysis contained in the same. Third, 
none of the three state court opinions that were represented in DOPL's brief as 
"adopting. . Justice Byron White's detailed First Amendment analysis"23 cite or 
make reference to the concurring opinion or the main opinion; this is not surprising 
since two of the three cases were decided before the 1985 opinion was issued. 
Fourth, the Utah Supreme Court has already indicated a preference for Utah 
constitutional analysis; therefore, is no need to begin with a federal analysis.24 
Furthermore, the three opinions involved with regulating speech and 
licensure that Hodsen and Anderson have located that followed Justice White's 
DOPL concedes as much. See Brief of DOPL at 18 n. 10. 
BriefofDOPLat18. 
See West v. Thomson Newspaper. 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). 
11 
analysis are also distinguishable. In 1992, the New York Court of Appeals opinion 
in In re Rowe25 applied the opinion of Justice White to determine that a suspended 
attorney's preparation of a law-related article for general reading and use of initials 
J.D. after his name did not constitute the practice of law.26 This case is 
distinguishable from that of Hodsen and Anderson because the conduct 
complained of did not involve any particular client. In 1988, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit in Accountants' Society of Virginia v. Bowman,27 held that "the 
restrictions imposed . . . on the use of certain terms in the work product of non-
CPAs, amount to the permissible regulation of a profession, not an abridgement of 
speech by the first amendment."28 This opinion prohibited certain speech engaged 
in by the non-licensed persons; in this case the source of the communication that 
is prohibited by UMPA arises from the speech of others, even if the speech is (1) 
in writing from a licensed health care provider, (2) derived from government 
approved, home-use testing equipment, (3) derived from a religiously based or 
spiritual experience of the speaker, or (4) based on oral or written history provided 
by the person. A 1988 in the opinion of the Louisiana Court of Appeals opinion in 
25
 80 N.Y.2d 336, 604 N.E.2d 728, 590 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1992). 
26
 Jd. at 342, id. at 741. 
27
 860 F.2d 602 (4th Cir. 1988). 
28
 Jd. at 604. 
12 
Accountants' Association of Louisiana v. State of Louisiana,29 forbade non-licensed 
accountants from issuing "review" reports (which are less than audits but more than 
simply information gathering) which stated they were "prepared in accordance with 
established standards" rather than the phrase "in accordance with the standards 
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants". This 
prohibition is distinguishable from this case because the providing of information by 
a client to an unlicensed accountant was not forbidden nor his truthful and non-
misleading communication in return. The truthful and non-misleading information 
provided by Hodsen does not claim or imply it is in accordance with the standards 
of any organization of persons licensed by the State of Utah. 
POINT IV 
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS OF ANDERSON 
ARE SPECIFICALLY VIOLATED BY UMPA 
Anderson's religious beliefs regarding the use of herbs and other products 
of nature with "prudence and thanksgiving" depend upon and find meaning and 
enlargement in conjunction with the receipt of secular as well as Divinely inspired 
information. Before the 1996 amendments to UMPA, Anderson had been allowed 
to provide truthful and non-misleading information to Hodsen regarding herself and 
29
 533 So.2d 1251, 1254-1255 (La. Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied 538 So.2d 593 (La. 
1989), cert, denied sub, nom. Louisiana Society of Independent Accountants v. Louisiana. 
493 U.S. 813, 110 S.Ct. 60, 107 LEd.2d 28 (1989) 
13 
receive truthful and non-misleading information about herbs and other products of 
nature from Hodsen. DOPL, Hodsen and Anderson knew that Hodsen was not 
licensed as a physician but had graduated from medical school and thereafter 
gained substantial education and experience regarding the beneficial uses of herbs 
and other products of nature. Hodsen and Anderson believed Hodsen sought and 
received Divine inspiration in providing suggestions to Anderson who was free to 
purchase or not purchase lawful products from Hodsen. DOPL does not contest 
that Anderson's beliefs are sincerely held or that as a result of the 1996 
amendments, Anderson is unable to share and receive information that has 
harmed her, damaged her physically and spiritually, and diminished her quality of 
life. The State's prohibition of an exchange of information under these 
circumstances is significantly different from the example given in DOPL's brief 
regarding having an unlicensed driver drive a vehicle for another person.30 There 
is no express constitutional right — much less an inherent and inalienable one — 
to have or use a driver's license.31 Thus, DOPL's driver's license analogy is only 
30
 See DOPL Brief at 30. 
31
 Obviously such a right could not have been considered at the 1896 Constitutional 
Convention before widespread use of automobiles, creation of roads, gasoline taxes, and 
licensing requirements. No express text guarantees the right to drive on public roads. 
14 
relevant to those rights where "the less a right is protected, the lower threshold for 
state regulation".32 
On the other hand, an inherent and inalienable right to engage in truthful 
speech to formulate religious belief and act thereon in accordance with one's 
conscience has been assumed to exist from the founding of our nation. The Utah 
constitution's guarantee of "[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment"33 and 
assurance that "the rights of conscience shall not be infringed"34 are mandates that 
this type of conduct merits constitutional protection from any infringement or 
inhibition imposed by a lawfully constituted government except in the most exigent 
circumstances. As these rights of Anderson and other prospective clients are 
subject to specified protections provided in the Declaration of Rights in Utah's 
constitution, examination of infringement upon or impediment to the exercise of 
their rights is more analogous to those situations where "the more the right 
deserves protection, the more compelling the state's interest must be to merit 
interference."35 
32
 Elks Lodge #719 and # 2021 (Moab) v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control, supra, 
905P.2dat1195. 
33
 Utah Const., Art. I l l § 1 . 
34
 Utah Const., Art. I § 4. 
35
 Elks Lodge #719 and # 2021 (Moab) v. of Alcoholic Bev. Control, 
905P.2dat1195. 
15 
The legal authorities relied upon by DOPL to justify prohibiting the exchange 
of truthful information are distinguishable from the facts and law applicable to this 
case. The 1917 United States Supreme Court case Crane v. Johnson36 was 
decided solely on the basis of an Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
challenge. Since neither Hodsen nor Anderson have asserted this claim under 
either the Utah of the United States Constitution, this precedent is irrelevant. 
The 1917 case of People v. Voqelaesanq37 determined that an unlicensed 
practitioner could not use a religious exemption to licensure when treatment 
provided involved both spiritual components and application of temporal remedies. 
This is distinguishable in two ways from this case. First, Hodsen has not asserted 
that his conduct is protected by the traditional religious exemption of UMPA.38 
(Because Hodsen has not done so, Anderson may not seek truthful information 
from Hodsen regarding lawful products of nature unless Hodsen receives no truthful 
information from her or anyone else regarding any condition of Anderson.) Second, 
in the absence of diagnosis, UMPA does not require the licensure of those involved 
in sale of herbs and other products of nature39 nor prohibit the exchange of truthful 
36
 242 U.S. 339, 37 S.Ct. 176, 61 L.Ed. 348 (1917). 
37
 221 N.Y. 290, 116 N.E. 977 (Ct.App. 1917). 
38
 See U.C.A. § 58-67-305(4). 
39
 See U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3)(a)(i). 
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and non-misleading information regarding herbs and other products of nature.40 
Thus, both Hodsen's position and that of the State of Utah is contrary to the 
decision of New York to narrowly limit a religious exemption to medical licensure as 
applying solely to religious means and not religious and secular means. 
The 1932 Washington Supreme Court opinion of Washington v. Verbon41 is 
also distinguishable. In response to a contention that Verbon's religious freedom 
was being violated, the Washington Court held 
[t]he enforcement of reasonable and necessary regulations in the 
practice of medicine, so commonly provided for under the statues of 
the different states enacted under the general police power as 
essential in the preservation of the public health and general welfare, 
must not be taken to be violative of this provision of the constitution.42 
These observations are distinguishable from this case for at least two reasons. 
First, only three states presently define "diagnose" or "diagnosis" so that the 
40
 "Exemption from licensure is allowed for "a person acting in good faith for religious 
reasons, as a matter of conscience, or based on personal belief, when obtaining or 
providing any information regarding health care and the use of. . .[herbs or other products 
of nature, which is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law]." U.C.A. § 58-67-
305(3)(a)(ii). This exemption, however, does "not allow a person to diagnose" or "prohibit 
providing truthful and non-misleading information regarding any of the products under 
Subsection 3a(i)." U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3)(b). Perhaps the tension between not prohibiting 
truthful and non-misleading information regarding herbs, protecting access to information 
about the same, and prohibiting diagnosis arose simply because of the failure of those 
amending the legislation to recognize that Utah's unique definition of diagnosis included 
solely reliance on information rather than the more tradition components that are also 
included in the definition. 
41
 167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d 1083 (1932). 
42
 Jd. at 148-149, id at 1086. 
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prohibited conduct may include only reliance on information supplied by another. 
The three states are Indiana,43 Oregon,44 and Utah.45 Oregon effectively eliminates 
the constitutional conflict present in this case because of a broad exemption stating 
that 
[njothing in this chapter interferes in any manner with an individual's 
right to select the practitioner or mode of treatment of an individual's 
choice, or interferes with the right of the person so employed to give 
the treatment so chosen if public laws and rules are complied with.46 
The 1932 rationale of the Washington Supreme Court presumed that the 
"reasonable and necessary regulations in the practice of medicine, [are] commonly 
provided for under the statues of the different states." Indiana is the sole state that 
has upheld regulations similar to that of Utah.47 This minimal companion precedent 
for the extreme position taken by the 1996 UMPA amendments is insufficient to 
43
 Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 25-22.5-1-1.1 (1998) ("It is not necessary that the 
examination be made in the presence of the patient; it may be made on information 
supplied either directly or indirectly by the patient.") 
44
 O.R.S. § 667.010 (1997) ("It is not necessary that the examination be made in the 
presence of the patient; it may be made on information supplied either directly or indirectly 
by the patient.") 
45
 U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d). ("[T]o make an examination or determination as described 
in Subsection 4(a) upon or from information supplied directly or indirectly by another 
person, whether or not in the presence of the person attempting the diagnosis or 
examination.") 
46
 O.R.S. §677.060(6) (1997). 
47
 See Steina v. State ex. rel. Medical Licensing Board of Indiana, 513 N.E.2d 1234 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987). 
18 
establish the assumption made by the Washington Court. Second, the provisions 
of the Washington Constitution that guaranteed "absolute freedom of conscience 
in all matters of religious sentiment, belief, and worship" were specifically limited by 
an express provision disavowing any intent to "justify practices inconsistent with the 
peace and safety of the state."48 Utah does not have such a generic provision. 
Even if it did, the exemptions afforded under UMPA to truthful and non-misleading 
speech or speech involving an exchange of information for religious or other deeply 
held beliefs undermine any claim that the State has some compelling interest in 
denying the liberties and freedoms Hodsen and Anderson desire to exercise. 
The 1980 case of Rutherford vs. United States49 can be distinguished from 
this case for at least two reasons. First, the case dealt with FDA marketing 
requirements, not patient receipt of information. 
It is apparent in the context with which we are here concerned that the 
decision by the patient whether to have a treatment or not is a 
protected right, but his selection of a particular treatment, or at least a 
medication, is within the area of governmental interest in protecting 
public health. The premarketing requirement of the Federal Good, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, is an exercise of 
Congressional authority to limit the patient's choice of medication.50 
48
 Wash. Const, Art. |§ 11. 
49616F.2d455(10 thCir. 1980) cert, denied 449 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 336, 66 LEd.2d 
937(1980). 
50
 ]d- at 457. 
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Second, the limitation arose because of failure to follow federal procedures in 
demonstrating pre-market safety, consistency, and validity of claims regarding 
laetrile. In this case, the information provided deals with products that are in 
conformity with state and federal law. 
The 1990 federal district court case of Peckham v. Thompson,51 can be 
distinguished from this case for at least two reasons. First, the opinion cites the 
Rutherford precedent for the proposition that "there is no constitutional right to 
select a particular treatment of procedure over the rational objections of 
government."52 For reasons cited above, this authority is distinguishable. Second, 
the district court opinion found the alleged licensing prohibitions as to midwifery 
were too vague to enforce against midwives. Hodsen and Anderson's challenge 
focuses on overbreadth not vagueness. 
POINT V 
THE PROHIBITION ON HODSEN'S PROPOSED MODIFIED USE OF "M.D." 
UNJUSTIFIABLY INFRINGES ON HIS SPEECH RIGHTS 
Hodsen has received a M.D. degree from U.C.L.A. Hodsen would like to use 
this title on business cards and journal articles, adding a disclaimer that he is a 
51
 745 F. Supp. 1388 (C.D.C. III. 1990) remanded with instructions, 966 F.2d 295 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
52
 Id. citing Rutherford v. United States. 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980) cert, denied 
449 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 336, 66 LEd.2d 937 (1980). 
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"Graduate of U.C.L.A. School of Medicine" and a "Research Biochemist not in 
medical practice." DOPL interprets UMPA as prohibiting Hodsen's speech because 
even with the added clarifications, Hodsen's use of the designation "M.D." after his 
name "might cause a reasonable person to believe that Hodsen is a licensed 
physician and that such use, in connection with Hodsen's business, may be 
deceptive or misleading regarding Hodsen's status" in terms of licensure. This 
concern is unjustified in this case for at least three reasons. 
First, the use of the modified "M.D." designation in journal articles will not 
confuse or mislead a "reasonable person" as to the licensure status of Hodsen. If 
DOPL is correct is that Justice White's analysis has merit in regulating speech and 
professional licensure, regulating Hodsen's speech in a journal article that is 
designed for general rather than individual use violates the First Amendment. 
Furthermore, since in Hodsen's case the use of the designation "M.D." — is limited 
by the express language referring to his status of graduating from a particular 
school and stating he is not in medical practice — the distinctions recognized 
previously by the New York Court of Appeals in the 1992 case of |n re Rowe would 
be applicable here. Under this analysis, the efforts of DOPL to distinguish the 
application of limited commercial speech restrictions in the United States Supreme 
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Court Ibanez opinion53 as being limited to only those who were professionally 
licensed54 has no meaning because for journal article writing, Hodsen would not 
have to be licensed. 
Second, as it relates to use by Hodsen of a business card with his disclaimed 
M.D. designation, the prohibition is overbroad. So long as any sale is done without 
"diagnosis" being involved, Hodsen is exempt from licensure. When a sale is done 
that includes "diagnosis" as outlined in this case, the language that brings Hodsen 
within licensure regulation does not come from Hodsen; hence, no individual is 
going to be misled by Hodsen's truthful and non-misleading speech in response to 
the same. 
Third, if DOPL agreed that the speech was not misleading as clarified, the 
statute prohibits Hodsen from listing his M.D. degree without listing "of the branch 
of the healing arts for which the person has a license."55 Such a requirement is an 
absolute bar on Hodsen's listing of truthful and non-misleading information about 
himself. This type of prior restraint is unlawful under both the Utah and United 
States Constitution. 
512 U.S. 316, 114 S.Ct. 2084, 129 LEd.2d 118 (1994). 
DOPL Brief at 27-28. 
U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(d). 
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CONCLUSION 
DOPL has been unable to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest 
that would justify the prohibition on an exchange of information between Hodsen 
and Anderson that is truthful and non-misleading. The prohibition infringes upon 
the rights of Hodsen and Anderson to give and receive private and commercial 
speech as well as Anderson's right to formulate religious belief and act on the 
same, whether as an exercise of religious freedom or privacy to one's personal 
autonomy and bodily integrity. Hodsen also has a right of private and commercial 
speech to use the term "M.D." after his name with the suggested disclaimers to 
ensure that no reasonable person is misled as to his licensure status with DOPL by 
his use of the same. 
DATED and EXECUTED this 11th day of August, 1999. 
hitifjjUliifm 
Matthew Hilton of Matthew Hilton, P.C. 
Attorney for Hodsen and Anderson 
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